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H. J. WILSON, Appellant, v. WILLIAM G. SHARP et
Defendants; HAROLD W. KENNEDY, Respondent.
[1] Appeal-Decisions Appealable-Orders on Motion to St.rike.An order granting motion to strike the only count of the
complaint that purports to allege a cause of action against
county counsel, so as to leave no issues to be determined
between him and plaintiff, is appealable as a "final judgment."
(Code Civ. Proc., § 963.)
[2] Pleading-Waiver-Failure of Complaint to State Cause of
Action.-Objection that complaint does not state cause of
action is not waived by failure to demur and may be raised
at any time. (Code Civ. Proc., § 434.)
[3] Counties-Actions-Recovery of Money Unlawfully Paid.Gov. Code, § 26525, relating to recovery of county moneys
paid out without authority of law, creates a cause of action
against recipients of illegal payments, but does not create
cause of action against county counsel or district attorney.
[4] !d.-Actions-Recovery of Money Unlawfully Paid.-References in Gov. Code, § 26525, to payments ordered and made
"without authority of law" or "without authorization by the
board or law" show that decision as to whether the circumstances of a particular case warrant institution of proceedings on behalf of county to recover money unlawfully paid
involves determination of questions of law and fact, and such
determination necessarily requires exercise of discretion by
legal officer of county.
[5] !d.-Actions-Recovery of Money Unlawfully Paid.-In exercising his discretion whether to institute a suit under Gov.
Code, § 26525, to recover money unlawfully paid, county counsel must determine not only whether there has been a violation
of law but also whether action is justified under all the facts,
and public welfare requires that such decision should be made
free from fear of civil liability.
[6] !d.-Liability of Officers-County Counsel.-County counsel is
immune from civil liability where he refrains from acting in
a matter coming within scope of his authority, and where
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Appeal and Error, § 39 et seq.; Am.Jur.,
Appeal and Error, § 73.
[3] See Cal.Jur.2d, Counties, § 84 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Appeal and Error, § 41; [2] Pleading, § 278; [3-5] Counties, § 166; [6] Counties, § 82; [7] Counties, § 168.
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his decision to act Ol' refrain from acting necessarily involves
the exercise of discretion.
[7] !d.-Actions-Recovery of Money Unlawfully Paid.-A count
in a complaint alleging that county counsel failed, after demand, to institute suit to recover salary paid an officer whose
appointment was allegedly void fails to state a cause of action.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County granting a motion to strike from second
amended complaint a second cause of action. Ellsworth
Meyer, Judge. Affirmed.
John J. Guerin for Appellant.
Harold W. Kennedy, County Counsel (Los Angeles), John
B. Anson and Arvo Van Alstyne, Deputy County Counsel,
for Respondent.
GIBSON, C. J.-Plaintiff, a taxpayer, seeks by this action
on behalf of Los Angeles County to recover from defendant
Sharp and several officers of the county the salary paid by
the county to Sharp, to enjoin further payment of salary to
him, and to obtain a judgment declaring the rights and duties
of the parties. Defendant Harold W. Kennedy, County
Counsel, was not named as a defendant in the original or
the first amended complaint but was made a defendant for
the first time in the second amended complaint. The sole
basis for recovery alleged as to him appears in the second
count of the complaint, which purports to state a cause of
action only against him. The trial court granted a motion
to strike the second count, and plaintiff has appealed from
the order granting the motion.
The original complaint and the two amended complaints
allege as follows : The Los Angeles County Civil Service
Commission called a promotional examination to fill a vacancy
in the classified services and knowingly fixed the requirements so that only Sharp could qualify. The commission
made an eligible list showing that Sharp was the only applieant and determined his rating by investigation rather than
by competitive examination. After certification by the commission, the county clerk appointed Sharp to the position,
and he was paid for his services out of public funds. It
was further averred that the eligible list and Sharp's appointment were void and that the payment of public money to
him was unauthorized.
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notice of
after
demand, to institute an actiou
of the
to recover the
barred by the statute of limitations at
time this action
was con~menced. He claims tllat the barred payments could
have been recovered if timely suit had been brought by the
eounty counsel.
[1] The order granting the motion to strike operated to
remove from the ease the only cause of action alleged against
the county counsel and to leave no issues to be determined
between him and plaintiff, and it was appealable as a "final
judgment" within the meaning of section 963 of the Code of
Civil Procedure.* (Yotmg v.
Court, 16 Cal.2d 211,
214-215 [105 P.2d 363]; Howe v. Key System Transit Co.,
198 Cal. 525 [246 P. 39] ;
v. Bttellton Dev. Co., 58
Cal.App.2d 178, 181 [136 P.2d 79:3] ; County of Hu.mboldt
v. Kay, 57 Cal.App.2d 115, 119 [134 P.2d 501]; see Hen'scher v. Herrsche1·, 41 Cal.2d 300, 303-304 [259 P.2d 991] .)
'l'he motion to strike vms made on the ground that specified
allegations were irrelevant, and it was argued that the second
cause of action attempted to set up, by way of amendment,
a wholly different cause of action based upon a wholly different legal liability. It is unnecessary to consider whether
the trial court should have granted the motion on the grounds
stated because, as we shall see, the stricken matter fails to
state a cause of action, and plaintiff was not prejudiced by
the ruling. (See Wilson v.
194 Cal. 653, 659 [229 P.
945]; Barr Ltlmber Co. v. Shaffer, 108 Cal.App.2d 14, 23
[238 P.2d 99); Neal v. Bank of America, 93 Cal.App.2d 678,
683 [209 P.2d 825].) [2] The objection that a complaint
does not state a eause of action is not waived by a failure to
demur and may be raised at any time. (Code Civ. Proc.,
~ 434: Horacek v. Smith, 33 Cal.2d 186, 191 [199 P.2d 929) ;
Ryan v. Holliday, 110 CaL 335, 337 [42 P. 891].)
The stricken cause of action seeks relief on the theory
that section 26525 of the Government Code imposed on the
-•section 963 of the Code of Civil Procedure reads in part, ''An appeal
may Le taken from a superior court in the following cases:
'' 1. Prom a final judgment. entered in an action,
special proceeding,
commenced in a superior court, or brought into a superior court from
another court; . . .. ''

or
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county counsel a mandatory duty to institute proceedings
to recover assertedly unauthorized payments to Sharp. Section 26525 provides in part: ''If the board of supervisors
without authority of law orders any amount paid . . . and
the money is actually paid, or if any county officer draws
any warrant . . . without authorization by the board or law
and the warrant is paid, the district attorney shall institute
suit in the name of the county to recover the money paid,
and 20 per cent damages for the use thereof." It is conceded
that the County Counsel of Los Angeles County has the
functions and duties of a district attorney under this statute,
and we will discuss the problem as if the statute expressly
mentioned the county counsel.
[3] Section 26525 creates a cause of action against the
recipients of illegal payments. (Miller v. McKinnon, 20 Cal.
2d 83, 95-96 [124 P.2d 34, 140 A.L.R. 570]; County of Santa
Barbara v. Janssens, 177 Cal. 114, 118 [169 P. 1025, L.R.A.
1918C 558] ; see Galli v. Brown, 110 Cal.App.2d 764, 778-779
[243 P.2d 920] .) It does not, however, purport to create a
cause of action against a district attorney or county counsel,
and we must consider whether, under general principles of
law, an action will lie for failure to institute suit against
the recipient of illegal payments. [4] The references in
the statute to payments ordered and made "without authority
of law" or "without authorization by the board or law" show
that the decision as to whether the circumstances of a particular case warrant the institution of proceedings is a matter
involving the determination of questions of law and fact.
Such a determination necessarily requires the exercise of
discretion, and it would seem obvious that the legal officer
of the county is the proper person to exercise this discretion.
(See Boyne v. Ryan, 100 Cal. 265, 267 [34 P. 707]. Compare
Board of Supervisors v. Simpson, 36 Cal.2d 671 [227 P.2d
14] [mandate granted where statute imposed nondiscretionary
duty upon district attorney to bring abatement action when
so directed by board of supervisors] . ) The Boyne case was
decided when the statute on which section 26525 is based
provided, in somewhat stronger language, that it was the
"duty" of the district attorney to institute suit to recover
illegal payments. It was nevertheless held that he was vested
with discretion and could not be compelled by mandamus
to bring suit. The same discretion is vested under the present
statute.
[5] In exercising his discretion, the county counsel must
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determine not only whether there has been a violation of law
but also whether action is justified under all the facts, and
the public welfare requires that the decision should be made
free from fear of civil liability. A clear analogy is to be
found in the cases holding that officials who are directly
connected with the judicial processes are immune from civil
liability while acting within the scope of their authority.
(White v. Towers, 37 Cal.2d 727, 729 et seq. (235 P.2d 209,
28 A.L.R.2d 636] [malicious prosecution, fish and game investigator] ; Coverstone v. Davies, 38 Cal.2d 315, 322 [239
P.2d 876] [malicious prosecution, sheriff] ; Turpen v. Booth,
56 Cal. 65, 68 [38 .Am.Rep. 48] [grand juror] ; Downer v.
Lent, 6 Cal. 94 [95 .Am.Dec. 489] [pilot commissioners, revocation of pilot's license]; Norton v. Hoffmann, 34 Cal.App.2d
189, 198-199 [93 P.2d 250] [malicious prosecution, city attorney] ; White v. Brinkman, 23 Cal.App.2d 307, 311 [73 P.2d
254] [malicious prosecution, district attorney] ; Pearson v.
Reed, 6 Cal.App.2d 277, 280 et seq. [44 P.2d 592] (prosecuting attorney].) [6] While the cases cited above concerned
the question of liability for affirmative action, it would seem
clear that the same rule of immunity should apply where,
as here, the county counsel refrains from acting in a matter
coming within the scope of his authority and where his decision to act or refrain from acting necessarily involves the
exercise of discretion. [7] It follows that the second count
of the second amended complaint fails to state a cause of
action, hence plaintiff was not prejudiced by the order granting the motion to strike.
The order is affirmed.
Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., and
Spence, J., concurred.
CARTER, J.-I dissent.
The majority opinion holds that a county counsel (the
same rule would apply to the district attorney if there were
no county counsel) is not liable to the county for failure to
take action for the recovery of county funds allegedly illegally
paid to a third person, a county employee in this case. I
assume, for the purposes of this dissent, as does the majority
opinion, that the funds were illegally expended. The majority
bases its conclusion on two grounds: (1) That it rests wholly
within the discretion of the county counsel as to whether
he will prosecute an action for the recovery of such funds,
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and hence, he cannot be liable under any circumstances;
( 2) "public welfare" requires that he be not liable by analogy
to the cases (White v. Towers, 37 Cal.2d 727 [235 P.2d 209,
28 A..L.R.2d 636]; Coverstone v. Davies, 38 Cal.2d 315 [239
P.2d 876]; Turpen v. Booth, 56 Cal. 65 [38 Am.Rep. 48] ;
Downer v. Lent, 6 Cal. 94 [95 A.m.Dec. 489]; Norton v.
Hoffmann, 34 Cal.App.2d 189 [93 P.2d 250] ; White v. Brinkman, 23 Cal.A.pp.2d 307 [73 P.2d 254]) holding that public
welfare requires freedom on the part of certain officers in
the performance of their duties from possible liability to
third persons who are injured by their action or nonaction;
and that the public's interest in having them fearlessly perform their duties outweighs the injury to third persons.
The first ground is contrary to the holding of this court
in Board of Sttpervisors v. Simpson, 36 Cal.2d 671 [227
P.2d 14]. In that case the question was whether the district
attorney could be compelled by mandamus to prosecute an
action to abate a public nuisance. We held that while ordinarily a district attorney could not be compelled to prosecute
a criminal case, because, whether or not he prosecuted it
rested in his discretion, but that a mandatory duty was imposed upon him to abate a nuisance and he had no discretion
in the matter. We said: ''As pointed out above, the district
attorney must or shall bring an action to abate a public
nuisance when so directed by the board of supervisors. (Code
Civ Pro c., § 731, sttpra; Gov. Code, § 26528.) 'Shall' is
mandatory (Gov. Code, § 14), and certainly 'must' is also.
The writ of mandamus issues '. . . to compel the performance
of an act which the law specially enjoins, as a duty resulting
from an office . . . ' (Code Civ. Proc., § 1085.) The statutes
(Code Civ. Proc., § 731; Gov. Code, § 26528) specifically
'enjoin' upon the district attoTney 'as a duty resulting from
(his) office' the bringing of actions to abate public nuisances
when directed by the board of supervisors." (Emphasis
added.) Similarly, in the case at bar, section 26525 of the
Government Code provides that if county money is illegally
expended the district attorney "shall" (emphasis added)
institute suit to recover it. The duty is mandatory. He has
no discretion in the matter. Even if there is some discretion
it would be
in respect to the facts of the case-~whether
they were sucl1 as to show an illegal expenditure. The plaintiff in this action alleged that he gave all the facts to the
county counsel, and as far as appears, the county counsel
arbitrarily refused to bring an action to recover the illegal
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payments; his refusal was not an exercise by him of his
discretion on the facts, but a failure to perform his official
duty.
Heliance is placed upon Boyne v. Ryan, 100 Cal. 265 [34
P. 707}, as showing· the county counsel had discretion in
the matter. It is not in harmony with the Simpson case
and moreover the court said that if the district attorney
"wilfully" refused to prosecute the action he could be proceeded against for malfeasance or nonfeasance in office. If
that is true, certainly he should be liable to the county for
his conduct.
I cannot agree with the second ground. I reiterate the
position I took in my dissents in White v. Towers, supra,
37 Cal.2d 727, and Coverstone v. Davies, supra, 38 Cal.2d
:315, that public office holding should not be a cloak immunizing the officer from liability for his wrongful acts. In addition to that, however, the rule of those cases cannot apply
to the case at bar. In those cases, according to the majority,
the public welfare was preserved by enabling the officers
to perform more effectively their public functions, and to
achieve that purpose they should be free from liability to third
persons injured in the course of the performance of official
duty; that the public welfare so preserved was of such superior
importance that the rights of the injured persons must give
way. In the case at bar, however, no such situation exists.
Here it is obvious that the public interest would be preserved
by recovering the county funds illegally spent, as opposed, at
the most, to the public interest achieved in fearless failure
of the county counsel to perform his official duty by refusing
to take the necessary action to protect the public interest.
In fact there is no public interest achieved in having official
duty performed when such performance consists of a refusal
or failure to bring an action to recover such funds. The
only way to preserve the public interest here is by the prosecution of such an action. In short, it cannot logically be
said that the public interest is preserved by the failure of
public officials to perform their official duty. Therefore, the
analogy between this case and the cited cases completely
fails. Indeed, under the facts herA alleged, the public interest
requires that the county counsel be held liable for failure to
perform his official duty in prosecuting an action for the
recovery of the funds allegedly illegally expended.
r would reverse the judgment.

